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We propose a general method for studying properties of quantum channels acting on an n-partite
system, whose action is invariant under permutations of the subsystems. Our main result is that,
in order to prove that a certain property holds for any arbitrary input, it is sufficient to consider
the special case where the input is a particular de Finetti-type state, i.e., a state which consists of n
identical and independent copies of an (unknown) state on a single subsystem. A similar statement
holds for more general channels which are covariant with respect to the action of an arbitrary finite
or locally compact group.
Our technique can be applied to the analysis of information-theoretic problems. For example,
in quantum cryptography, we get a simple proof for the fact that security of a discrete-variable
quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks implies security of the protocol against
the most general attacks. The resulting security bounds are tighter than previously known bounds
obtained by proofs relying on the exponential de Finetti theorem [1].
In quantum mechanics, the most general way of de-
scribing the evolution of a subsystem A (A may be part
of a larger system) at time t to a subsystem A′ at a later
point in time t′ is by application of a quantum channel.
Mathematically, a quantum channel is a completely pos-
itive trace-preserving (CPTP) map transforming the re-
duced density matrix ρA of system A at time t to ρA′ , the
reduced density matrix of system A′ at time t′. CPTP
maps are used in various areas of physics and information
theory. A CPTP map modeling a particular quantum
communication channel, for instance, describes how the
channel output ρA′ depends on the input ρA.
A common method to characterize a given CPTP map
E is to compare it to an idealized CPTP map F that is
well understood, e.g., because it has a simple description.
For instance, given a physical communication channel
specified by E , one may characterize its ability to reliably
transmit messages by showing its similarity to a perfect
channel F characterized by the identity mapping id. An-
other example is the analysis of information-theoretic or
cryptographic protocols (e.g., for quantum key distribu-
tion). Here, E may be the action of the actual protocol
while F is the ideal functionality the protocol is supposed
to reproduce. We are then typically interested in proving
that E is almost equal to F (in quantum cryptography,
this corresponds to proving security).
In order to compare two CPTP maps E and F , we
need a notion of distance. A natural choice is the metric
induced by the diamond norm ‖ ·‖⋄ [9] since it is directly
related to the maximum probability that a difference can
be observed between the processes described by E and
F , respectively. More precisely, consider a hypothetical
game where a player is asked to guess whether a given
physical process is described by E or F , which are both
equally likely to be the correct descriptions. If the player
is allowed to observe the process once (with an input of
his choice, possibly correlated with a reference system)
then the maximum probability p of a correct guess is
given by p = 12 +
1
4‖E − F‖⋄ . In particular, if E and F
are identical, the distance equals zero and, hence, p = 12 ,
corresponding to a random guess. On the other hand, if E
and F are perfectly distinguishable, we have ‖E−F‖⋄ = 2
and p = 1.
Here, we present a general method for computing an
upper bound on the distance ‖E−F‖⋄ between two maps
E and F , provided they act symmetrically on an n-partite
system with subsystems H of finite dimension. While, by
definition, the diamond norm involves a maximization
over all possible inputs, we show that for calculating the
bound it is sufficient to consider (relative to a reference
system) the particular input
τHn =
∫
σ⊗nH µ(σH) , (1)
where µ(·) is the measure on the space of density op-
erators on a single subsystem induced by the Hilbert-
Schmidt metric. States of the form (1) are also known
as de Finetti states. They describe the joint state of n
subsystems prepared as identical and independent copies
of an (unknown) density operator σH. Because of their
structure, de Finetti states are usually easy to handle in
calculations and proofs, as outlined below.
As an example, we apply this result to the security
analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes [2,
3]. Let E be the map describing a given QKD proto-
col, which takes as input n predistributed particle pairs
(which may have been generated in a preliminary pro-
tocol step). Security of the protocol (against the most
general attacks) is then defined by the requirement that
the protocol E is close to the ideal functionality F that
simply outputs a perfect key, independently of the input
(which may be arbitrarily compromised by the action of
an adversary). Now, according to our main result, this
distance is bounded by simply evaluating the map E for
an input of the form (1) and comparing the generated
key with a perfect key. We further show that this result
is equivalent to proving security of the scheme against a
restricted type of attacks, called collective attacks, where
the adversary is assumed to attack each of the parti-
cle pairs independently and identically. Our result thus
gives a simple proof for the statement (proved originally
in [1, 4]) that security of a QKD protocol against col-
lective attacks implies security against the most general
attacks. The resulting security bounds are tighter than
previously known bounds obtained by proofs relying on
the exponential de Finetti theorem [1].
Main Result. Let ∆ be a linear map from End(H⊗n)
to End(H′). In particular, ∆ may be the difference be-
tween two CPTP maps. End(L) denotes the space of
all endomorphisms on L, which includes the density op-
erators on L. We denote by π the map on End(H⊗n)
that permutes the subsystems with permutation π [10].
Our main result, the Post-Selection Theorem [11], gives
an upper bound on the norm of a permutation-invariant
map in terms of the action of the map on a purifica-
tion [12] τHnR of the state τHn defined by (1).
Theorem 1. If for any permutation π there exists a
CPTP map Kpi such that ∆ ◦ π = Kpi ◦∆, then
‖∆‖⋄ ≤ gn,d
∥∥(∆⊗ id)(τHnR)‖1 .
id denotes the identity map on End(R) and gn,d =(
n+d2−1
n
)
≤ (n+ 1)d
2−1, for d = dimH.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the following lemma
which relates arbitrary density operators ρHnKn on the
symmetric subspace Symn(H ⊗ K) ⊂ (H ⊗ K)⊗n, for
K ∼= H, to a particular purification of τHn . We de-
fine the state τHnKn =
∫
σ⊗nHKd(σHK) on Sym
n(H ⊗ K),
where d(·) is the measure on the pure states induced
by the Haar measure on the unitary group acting on
H ⊗ K. We note that τHnKn extends the state τHn de-
fined in (1), i.e., trKnτHnKn = τHn ; the measure µ(·)
furthermore is the one induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt
metric on End(H) [5]. Let now τHnKnN be a purification
of τHnKn .
Lemma 2. For ρHnKn a density operator supported on
Symn(H⊗K), with K ∼= H, there exists a trace-non-
increasing map T from the purifying system End(N ) to
C such that
ρHnKn = gn,d (id⊗ T )(τHnKnN ) , (2)
where id is the identity map on End((H ⊗ K)⊗n) and
d = dimH.
Proof. Let N ∼= Symn(H ⊗ K) and let {|νi〉}i be an
eigenbasis of ρHnKn . Since, by Schur’s lemma, τHnKn is
the state proportional to the identity on Symn(H ⊗ K),
τHnKnN := |Ψ〉〈Ψ|HnKnN is a purification of τHnKn ,
where |Ψ〉HnKnN := g
− 1
2
n,d
∑
i |νi〉 ⊗ |νi〉, and gn,d is the
dimension of Symn(H ⊗K). Furthermore, for any basis
vector |νi〉,
|νi〉〈νi|HnKn = gn,d trN (τHnKnN · 1HnKn ⊗ |νi〉〈νi|N ) ,
where 1HnKn ∈ End((H ⊗ K)⊗n) is the identity. This
implies (2) with T : σ 7→ tr(σρN ), since {|νi〉}i is an
eigenbasis of ρHnKn . Because T is clearly trace-non-
increasing, this concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. We need to show that for any finite-
dimensional space R′ and any density operator ρHnR′ ,∥∥(∆⊗ id)(ρHnR′)∥∥1 ≤ gn,d
∥∥(∆⊗ id)(τHnR)∥∥1 , (3)
for some purification τHnR of τHn . In a first step, we
show that it is sufficient to prove (3) for density operators
ρHnR′ with support on Sym
n(H⊗K), where K ∼= H and
R′ = K⊗n. To see this, let ρHnR′ be an arbitrary density
operator and define the density operator
ρ¯HnR′R′′ =
1
n!
∑
pi
(π ⊗ id)(ρHnR′)⊗ |π〉〈π|R′′ ,
where the sum ranges over all permutations π of the n
subsystems and where {|π〉}pi is an orthonormal family of
vectors on an auxiliary space R′′. Then, by construction,
the reduced state ρ¯Hn = trR′R′′(ρ¯HnR′R′′) is permuta-
tion invariant. Hence, according to [4, 6], there exists a
purification ρ¯HnKn of ρ¯Hn supported on Sym
n(H⊗K).
In particular, because all purifications are equivalent up
to isometries, there exists a CPTPmap G from End(K⊗n)
to End(R′ ⊗R′′) such that ρ¯HnR′R′′ = (id⊗G)(ρ¯HnKn).
Making use of the assumption on the permutation invari-
ance of ∆, we thus find that
∥∥(∆⊗ id)(ρHnR′)∥∥1 equals
1
n!
∑
pi
∥∥((∆ ◦ π)⊗ id)(ρHnR′)∥∥1 =
∥∥(∆⊗ id)(ρ¯HnR′R′′)∥∥1
=
∥∥(∆⊗ G)(ρ¯HnKn)∥∥1 ≤
∥∥(∆⊗ id)(ρ¯HnKn)∥∥1 ,
where the last inequality holds because a CPTP map
cannot increase the norm. It thus remains to show
that (3) holds for states ρHnKn in Sym
n(H⊗K). By
Lemma 2 there exists a map T such that ρHnKn =
gn,d (id⊗ T )(τHnKnN ). Then, by linearity, we have∥∥(∆⊗ id)(ρHnKn)∥∥1 = gn,d
∥∥(∆⊗ T )(τHnKnN )∥∥1 .
Inequality (3) then follows from the fact that T cannot
increase the norm and by setting R = K⊗n ⊗N .
Application to Quantum Key Distribution. QKD is the
art of generating a secret key known only to two distant
parties, Alice and Bob, connected by an insecure quan-
tum communication channel and an authentic classical
2
channel [13]. Most QKD protocols can be subdivided
into two parts. In the first, Alice and Bob use the quan-
tum channel to distribute n entangled particle pairs (this
phase may include advanced quantum protocols such as
quantum repeaters). In the second part, they apply local
measurements (we will restrict ourselves to the typical
case of measurements that are independent and identical
on each of the n pairs) followed by a sequence of classical
post-processing steps (such as parameter estimation, er-
ror correction, and privacy amplification) to extract ℓ key
bits [14]. It induces a map E from (HA ⊗HB)⊗n (the n
particle pairs) to the set of pairs (SA, SB) of ℓ-bit strings
(Alice and Bob’s final keys, respectively) and C, where
C is a transcript of the classical communication. Note
that ℓ may depend on the input; in particular, ℓ = 0 if
the entanglement of the initial particle pairs is too small
for key extraction.
A QKD protocol is said to be ε-secure (for some small
ε ≥ 0) if, for any attack of an adversary, the final keys SA
and SB computed by Alice and Bob are identical, uni-
formly distributed, and independent of the adversary’s
knowledge, except with probability ε. This criterion can
be reformulated as a condition on the map E . Since an
adversary may have full control over the quantum chan-
nel connecting Alice and Bob, we require that, for any
input to E , the output is a pair (SA, SB) of secure keys
of length ℓ ≥ 0 [15]. To make this more precise, let S
be the map that acts on the output (SA, SB, C) of E
by replacing (SA, SB) by a pair (S
′
A, S
′
B) of identical and
uniformly distributed keys of the same length, while leav-
ing C unchanged. With this definition, the concatenated
map F := S ◦E describes an ideal key distillation scheme
which always outputs a perfect key pair. We then say
that E is ε-secure if ‖E − F‖⋄ ≤ ε.
E is typically invariant under permutations of the in-
puts. However, if it is not, permutation invariance can
be enforced by prepending an additional symmetrization
step where both Alice and Bob permute their inputs ac-
cording to a permutation π¯ chosen at random by one
party and communicated to the other using the classi-
cal channel [16]. We can thus apply Theorem 1 with
∆ := E − F , which implies that E is ε-secure whenever
∥∥((E − F)⊗ id)(τHnR)∥∥1 ≤ ε¯ := ε(n+ 1)−(d2−1) , (4)
where H := HA ⊗HB, where d = dim(H), and where
τHnR is a purification of the state τHn defined by (1).
We will now employ (4) to show that for proving se-
curity of a QKD protocol it suffices to consider collective
attacks, where the adversary acts on each of the signals
independently and identically. Using the above formal-
ism, we say that E is ε¯-secure against collective attacks if
‖
(
(E−F)⊗id
)
(σ⊗nHK)‖1 ≤ ε¯, for any (pure) σHK onH⊗K,
where K ∼= H. This immediately implies that the same
bound holds for the extension τHnKn =
∫
σ⊗nHKd(σHK)
of τHn ,
‖(E − F)⊗ idKn(τHnKn)‖1
≤ max
σHK
‖(E − F)⊗ idKn(σ
⊗n
HK)‖1 ≤ ε¯ . (5)
To obtain criterion (4), we need to show that a similar
bound still holds if we consider a purification τHnKnN of
τHnKn . For this, we think of N as an additional system
that is available to an adversary. Because N can be cho-
sen isomorphic to Symn(H⊗K), its dimension is bounded
by (n+1)d
2−1. The idea is then to compensate the extra
information available to the adversary by slightly reduc-
ing the size of the final key. More precisely, according to
the privacy amplification theorem (Theorem 5.5.1 of [4]),
the protocol E ′ obtained from E by shortening the output
of the hashing by 2 log2 dimN ≤ 2(d
2−1) log2(n+1) bits
satisfies
‖(E ′ −F ′)⊗ idKnN (κ)‖1 ≤ ‖(E − F)⊗ idKn ⊗ trN (κ)‖1 .
Setting κ equal to τHnKnN and using (5), we conclude
that ‖(E ′ − F ′) ⊗ idKnN (τHnKnN )‖1 ≤ ε¯, which corre-
sponds to (4). We have thus shown that ε¯-security of E
against collective attacks implies ε-security of E ′ against
general attacks.
In the security analysis against collective attacks, the
security parameter ε¯ can be chosen exponentially small,
i.e., ε¯ ≤ 2−cδ
2n (for some c > 0), at the only cost of
reducing the key size by an (arbitrarily small) fraction δ
compared to the asymptotically optimal rate. The cru-
cial observation made in this paper is that the security
parameter ε for general attacks and ε¯ are polynomially re-
lated (see (4)). We thus find ε ≤ 2−cδ
2n+(d2−1) log
2
(n+1),
which shows that security under the assumption of col-
lective attacks implies full security essentially without
changing the security parameter. This security estimate
improves on previous estimates based on the exponential
de Finetti theorem and has a direct impact on the secu-
rity analysis of current experimental implementations.
Concluding remark. The technical results in this pa-
per deal with quantum states and channels that commute
with the action of the symmetric group on H⊗n, but can
be easily generalized to the action of an arbitrary finite
or locally compact group G on a space V [17]. Seen in
the light of more general symmetry groups G, we thus
hope that our results will find fundamental applications
in quantum physics beyond their presented use in quan-
tum information theory.
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